All men are originally in a of the Soil of the whole Earth (), and they have naturally each a Will to use it (). But on account of the opposition of the free Will of one to that of the other in the sphere of action, which is inevitable by nature, all use of the soil would be prevented did not every will contain at the same time a Law for the regulation of the relation of all Wills in action, according to which a can be determined to every one upon the common soil. This is the juridical Law (). But the distributive Law of the Mine and Thine, as applicable to each individual on the soil, according to the Axiom of external Freedom, cannot proceed otherwise than from a united Will —which does not presuppose any juridical act as requisite for this union. This Law can only take form in the Civil State (); as it is in this state alone that the united common Will determines what is what is and what is the constitution of In reference to this state, however,—and prior to its establishment and in view of it,—it is a for every one to proceed according to the Law of external Acquisition; and accordingly it is a juridical procedure on the part of the Will to lay every one under Obligation to recognise the act of possessing and appropriating, although it be only unilaterally. Hence a provisory Acquisition of the Soil, with all its juridical consequences, is possible in the state of Nature.
Nevertheless, such provisory Acquisition is real Acquisition. For, according to the Postulate of the juridically Practical Reason, the possibility of Acquisition in whatever state men may happen to be living beside one another, and therefore in the State of Nature as well, is a Principle of Private Right. And in accordance with this Principle, every one is justified or entitled to exercise that compulsion by which it alone becomes possible to pass out of the state of Nature, and to enter into that state of Civil Society which alone can make all Acquisition peremptory.
This is a remarkably penetrating claim; remember, the study ofreference and semantics generally is usually thought to have begun onlywith Frege. Kant is anticipating two important theses about referenceto self that next saw the light of day only 200 years later.
Furthermore, when we are conscious of ourselves as subject and agentby doing acts of apperceiving, we do appear to ourselves tobe substantial, simple and continuing. He had to explain theseappearances away; doing so was one of his aims, indeed, in his attacks onthe second and third Paralogisms. Thus, Kant had strong motives togive consciousness of self as subject special treatment. Let us sneakup on the way he did so via a couple of intermediate theses. Histreatment of the issue and attendant critique of the inflated views onit of his rationalist predecessors led him to some remarkable insightsinto reference to and consciousness of self.
The question is more complicated with respect to (2). We cannot gointo the complexities here (see Brook 2001). Here we will just notethree passages in which Kant may be referring to the essentialindexical or something like it.
Some interpreters of Kant, most notably Korsgaard (1996), seem toaffirm a kind of quietism about metaethics by rejecting many of theassumptions that contemporary metaethical debates rest on. Forexample, some of these philosophers seem not to want to assert thatmoral facts and properties just are the outcomes of deliberativeprocedures. Rather, they seem more eager to reject talk of facts andproperties as unnecessary, once a wholly acceptable and defensibleprocedure is in place for deliberation. That is, the whole frameworkof facts and properties suggests that there is something we need tomoor our moral conceptions to “out there” in reality, whenin fact what we only need a route to decision. Once we are moresensitive to the ethical concerns that really matter to us as rationalagents, we will find that many of the questions that animatemetaethicists turn out to be non-questions or of only minorimportance. Others have raised doubts, however, about whether Kantianscan so easily avoid engaging in metaethical debates (Hussain &Shaw 2013).
(April) After six years, and with the security of his professor’s salary (equalling about four-times as much as he had been making, once benefits were included), Kant resigns from his position at the Castle Library.
(October) Kant begins lecturing on Anthropology this semester, and continues to offer this course every winter semester until his retirement.
These were all revolutionary ideas, exploring both the logical and the psychological principles on which the complex whole of consciousness could be generated, but they tore up Kant's original plan for his system so much that he was never quite comfortable with them.
(October 10) Winter semester begins, with Kant lecturing on metaphysics, anthropology, and moral philosophy. It is likely from this semester that his best known set of moral philosophy notes stem (, , , etc.), and that were published in Menzer  and translated into numerous languages.
Other commentators interpret Kant as a robust moral realist (Ameriks2003; Wood 1999; Langton 2007; Kain 2004). According to thesephilosophers, Kant’s theory, properly presented, begins with theclaim that rational nature is an objective, agent-neutral andintrinsic value. The moral law then specifies how we should regard andtreat agents who have this special status. Autonomy of the will, onthis view, is a way of considering moral principles that are groundedin the objective value of rational nature and whose authority is thusindependent of the exercise of our wills or rational capacities.
Thus , who understood the meaning of Kant's change of approach, advised his readers that they would be wasting their time unless they obtained an edition of the that included the whole text from the first edition.
The universality of access to the experience of beauty is therefore limited in the same way that we are limited in understanding speech acts expressed in a natural language: anyone can learn artistic traditions or natural languages, and having learned them can communicate or experience the meanings and beauties found within them. Artistic creations are capable of giving us intense experiences, but their appreciation requires a sufficient knowledge of a shared human experience. In all of this, the permanent problem for criticism and the understanding of new art is, how and to what extent ought critical perception acknowledge the history and background of the art work? To this question, there can be no useful general answer, though it would be consistent with what Kant says throughout the to remark that criticism ought to be carried out in a spirit of seeking and enjoying free beauty in whatever context it can be discovered. Criticism too is therefore a demanding, though parasitic, imaginative activity.
Weingartner, A Note on Kants Aesthetic Interests, 16 (1957-58): 261-62. Kant had an engraving of Rousseau in his rooms, but no other painting or graphic work. Lewis White Beck, in (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), surmises that Kant probably never even saw a beautiful painting or a fine statuep.